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However, it may properly become a question of fact to determine whether a husband
in a particular action is acting in his representative capacity, or whether he is acting
in breach of his fiduciary duty. If it is found that he is not acting in good faith for
the community, his actions should not preclude the wife from any rights she would
have if it were not for the technicalities of the common ownership of property by
husband and wife. If he is acting in good faith and within the limits set by the
Legislature, the husband's right to manage and control community property (and
incidentally to represent the community in legal actions concerning that property)
is an absolute power and ends only with his death or a final decree of divorce.
Elizabeth B. Richards.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRE-TRIAL CONFINEMENT OF FEDERAL PRISONERS
BECAUSE OF MENTAL INCOMPETENCY.-Recognizing the problem of questionable juris-
diction over federal prisoners under criminal indictment who are mentally incompetent
to stand trial, Congress, in 1949, enacted legislation' giving the federal courts control
over the custody of such persons. This legislation was adopted largely at the instance
of the Judicial Conference of the United States and is based on recommendations
made by the Conference after a prolonged study by a special committee of leading
federal judges.
2
The statutes enacted are found in Title 18 U.S.C., sections 42444248, inclusive.
Section 4244 provides in part that:
"Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence . . . the United States
Attorney has reasonable cause to believe that a person charged may be presently insane
or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings
against him or properly assist in his own defense, he shall file a motion for a judicial
determination of such mental competency .... Upon such a motion . . ., or upon its own
motion, the court shall cause the accused . . . to be examined ... by at least one
qualified psychiatrist. . . . For the purpose of the examination the court may order the
accused committeed for such reasonable period as the court may determine to a suitable
hospital. . . . If the report of the psychiatrist indicates . . . such mental incompetency
in the accused, the court shall hold a hearing . . . [for judicial determination of mental
competency]. .. ."
Section 4246 of this title provides in part that:
"Whenever the trial court shall determine . . . that an accused is or was mentally
incompetent, the court may commit the accused to the custody of the Attorney General . . .
until the accused shall be mentally competent to stand trial or until the pending charges
against him are disposed of according to law. .. ."
Section 4248 prescribes the duration of the commitment:
"... [The] commitment shall run until the sanity or mental competency of the person
shall be restored or until the mental condition of the person is so improved that if he
be released he will not endanger the safety of the officers, the property, or other interests
of the United States, or until suitable arrangements have been made for the custody and
care of the prisoner, whichever event shall first occur ... "
Greenwood v. United States,3 a 1955 decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, raised questions involving the interpretation and constitutionality of this
legislation. This case was an appeal from an order of the district court 4 committing
'63 STAT. 686 (1949), entitled, "An Act: To provide for the care and custody of insane persons
charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States, and for other purposes."
' The committee was created in 1942; its recommendations were approved by the Judicial
Conference in 1946. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, Sept. Session 1942, pp. 18-19; id., Oct.
Session 1946, p. 18.
a 219 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 821 (1955).
'United States v. Greenwood, 125 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
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defendant Greenwood to the custody of the Attorney General for an indeterminite
time as provided for in section 4248.
The defendant was arrested in Cleveland, Ohio, the state of his residence, and
transported to the District Court for the Western District of Missouri pursuant to an
indictment charging him with the armed robbery of a Kansas City post office.
Previous psychiatric proceedings which indicated that the defendant was mentally
unfit for trial caused this court to order Greenwood sent to the United States Medical
Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri 5 for an examination as to
his mental condition.6 The reports of the psychiatric staff during the following year
showed that Greenwood was considered to be "legally insane"; that he might persist
in criminal activities if released; and that it was unlikely that he would regain his
sanity in the near future. It was recommended by the staff that the defendant be
transferred to a state hospital in the state of his residence and the district court so
ordered. The Ohio authorities had Greenwood examined by a psychiatrist and, upon
his conclusion that the defendant was not "insane in any legal sense," ordered his
release. Greenwood was again taken into federal custody and a hearing as to his
mental competency, pursuant to section 4244, was ordered by the district court and
counsel was appointed to represent the defendant. It was found by the court that:
(1) the defendant was insane and mentally incompetent to stand trial; (2) that if
released he would probably endanger the safety of the officers, the property, or other
interests of the United States; and (3) that no suitable arrangements for the custody
and care of the defendant, other than commitment to the custody of the Attorney
General, were presently available.
From'this order, Greenwood appealed, charging that: (1) the statutory provisions
authorizing such proceedings and commitment were unconstitutional as violative of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment or were encroachments upon the powers
reserved to the states by the tenth amendment; and (2) that these provisions, if
consitutional with regard to temporary mental incompetency, may not be so extended
to include cases where it appears that the incompetency is, or may be, permanent.
After discussing the legislative history of section 4244 et seq., the court, with one
dissent, concluded that the legislation was not in conflict with the Constitution and
that the order appealed from was valid. The question of probable duration of the
mental incompetency was resolved as immaterial to the applicability of the sections
involved.
Regarding the alleged denial of due process, the court had little difficulty in
sustaining the ruling of the district court. It appears unlikely that exceptions taken
on these grounds can be successful. The provisions of the statute,7 if properly followed,
adequately safeguard the right of the defendant to be heard and to defend himself
and the proceedings provided for are suitable and appropriate to the nature of the
case. Similar conclusions have been reached by other courts ruling upon this issue.,
The location of this hospital explains why many cases cited are from the Missouri District
Court.
'Authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1947).
7 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (1947) provides in part that: ... At such hearing the designated psychia-
trist or psychiatrists shall submit his or their reports, and the report of the board of examiners
and other institutional records relating to the prisoner's mental condition shall be admissible in
evidence. All of the psychiatrists and members of the board who have examined the prisoner may
be called as witnesses, and be available for . . .cross-examination. .. ."
'Craig v. Steele, 123 F. Supp. 153 (W.D. Mo. 1954). Also see Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp.
670 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
NOTESFeb. 19561
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Whether or not the subject matter of this legislation is properly within con-
gressional control as regards the tenth amendment, however, is a question which has
frequently troubled the federal courts. Despite two federal cases 9 that seemingly 0
held that federal power does not exist over mental incompetents who have not been
convicted of any offense, authority to the effect that the government does have
constitutionally sanctioned control within this area appears to be overwhelming."
In following this authority, the court in the principal case found that such control
was necessarily incidental to enumerated federal powers. 12 The court stated that:
"The national government has the undoubted right to define federal crimes; to provide
for the administration and enforcement of its criminal laws; to inscribe the penalties
which will be incurred by those violating them; to furnish institutions where such violators
can be confined; and generally do whatever reasonably and lawfully can be done to
protect society from such offenders. We have no doubt that as a necessary incident to
the power to provide for the enforcement of the criminal laws of the United States,
Congress had the power to enact the legislation in suit .... us
Both on reason and authority, then, it seems clear that the federal courts are
free to exercise at least limited control over mental incompetents. This is entirely
proper. A rule which prevented the temporary care and custody of federal prisoners
who would soon be capable of standing trial would unnecessarily and unreasonably
hamper the courts. Such a rule would serve no good purpose-nor would it materially
alter the ultimate proceedings, since the defendant in either event would be brought
to trial within a short period of time. Its only result would be to require the temporary
transfer of the defendant to a state hospital, or, if the hospital were unwilling to take
custody, to make necessary his outright release until such time as sanity has been
restored. As long as the primary objective of the confinement is the forthcoming
prosecution, and such confinement may be classified as a mere temporary delay, it is
not difficult to include the custody of these prisoners within the purview of incidental
powers. Hence, the doctrine of authority by virtue of necessarily incidental power
finds particular application with regard to temporary incompetency. Federal control
over prisoners who will soon be capable of standing trial is warranted as a practical
and reasonable solution of the not infrequent cases involving shock or temporary
mental breakdown following, or concurrent with, the commission of a crime.
But the question remains as to the limitation, if such exists, on this control with
regard to the probable duration of incompetency. Where the defendant is, or may be,
'Edwards v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 382 (W.D. Mo. 1952); Dixon v. Steele, 104 F. Supp. 904
(W.D. Mo. 1951).
10 Both of these cases have been distinguished as being unnecessarily expansive in ruling on
the confinement of both the temporarily incompetent and the permanently incompetent, since the
defendants apparently fell within the latter class. It is claimed by the dissenting judge in the
principal case that both cases have the effect of finding federal authority existent only over tempo-
rary incompetency, 219 F.2d 376, 388 (8th Cir. 1955). Distinguished similarly in Kitchens v. Steele,
112 F. Supp. 383, 385 (W.D. Mo. 1953). Dixon v. Steele (supra note 9), distinguished regarding
this point in United States v. Miller, 131 F. Supp. 88, 94 (Vt. 1955).
" Higgins v. United States, 205 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Wells, by Gillig v. Attorney General,
201 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Miller, 131 F. Supp. 88 (Vt. 1955) ; Wright v.
Steele, 125 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1954) ; Craig v. Steele, 123 F. Supp. 153 (W.D. Mo. 1954) ;
Kitchens v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670
(W.D. Mo. 1951).
"2 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, "[The Congress shall have Power] To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . .all . . .Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States ......
" Greenwood v. United States, 219 F.2d 376, 387 (8th Cir. 1955).
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permanently insane, commitment for the duration of his incompetency cannot be
justified as bearing any practical relation to eventual prosecution. On the contrary,
extension of federal control to this class of prisoners represents a departure from
the administration of criminal justice and an entry by the government into the general
field of civil commitment of the insane.
Jurisdiction over the persons and property of the insane has long been established
as an exclusive right of the states.14 This control is a function of the police powers
reserved to the states by the tenth amendment and any intrusion within this area
by the federal government must be considered an encroachment upon the sovereign
powers of the states. At that point where confinement ceases to constitute a mere delay
in prosecution, federal jurisdiction over the defendant terminates for want of consti-
tutional authority.
Greenwood v. United States squarely holds that no such distinction exists between
temporary and permanent incompetency insofar as requisite constitutional authority
is concerned. Following an extensive treatment of the legislative history of the
sections involved, the court points out the practical gains made possible by the
legislation upon the administration of justice in the federal courts. The court concludes
that it has no doubt that the required congressional authority is derived "as a necessary
incident to the power to provide for the enforcement of the criminal laws of the
United States." But the opinion omits to clarify precisely how an insane prisoner who
has not been convicted of crime may be committed and confined under the guise of
criminal jurisdiction. Although discussed in the dissenting opinion, the majority fails
to mention or explain the very tenuous connection between confinement of the perma-
nently incompetent and eventual prosecution. Apparently the basis for the decision
encompasses no more than a refusal to declare invalid procedures which greatly
facilitate the disposition of all cases involving mental incompetency.
Authority in support of this finding is not impressive. It includes three district
court opinions15 by the same judge (one of which cases reached a contrary result on
subsequent proceedings 16) and the dissenting opinion in a circuit court decision. 17
Contrary cases holding that federal control is limited to temporary incompetency
include decisions in district courts' s as well as two circuit court cases. Higgins v.
United States'9 and Wells, by Gillig v. Attorney General,20 decisions in the Ninth
and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal, respectively, are cases on equal appellate level
standing with the principal case which are clearly in conflict with this decision. In
the Higgins case, the court quoted with approval from the Wells opinion as follows:
"While the care of insane persons is essentially the function of the states in their
sovereign capacity as paens patriae, and while the federal government has neither
constitutional nor inherent power to enter the general field of lunacy, Congress has the
' 28 Am. Jur., Insane and Other Incompetent Persons, § 25 (1940), also citing cases.
" Craig v. Steele, 123 F. Supp. 153 (W.D. Mo. 1954) ; Kitchens v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383
(W.D. Mo. 1953) ; Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
" Higgins v. McGrath, supra note 15. Higgins ultimately was found to be unlawfully confined
if it should be determined ". . . that defendant is not, and will not within a reasonable time,
be able to stand trial by reason of mental incompetency...." Higgins v. United States, 205 F.2d
650 (9th Cir. 1953).
I Wells, by Gillig v. Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1953).
"Wright v. Steele, 125 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1954) ; Edwards v. Steele and Dixon v. Steele,
qualified and cited at supra note 10. Also see United States v. Miller, 131 F. Supp. 88 (Vt. 1955).
20 205 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1953).
20 201 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1953).
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